Kernel Dll Injector Page

Historically, the SSDT is a table that maps system calls (like NtCreateThread) to their corresponding kernel functions.

You can't run a userland hook inside the kernel. So, how do you detect this?

Drivers communicate via IRPs. A malicious driver can hook the IRP handlers of legitimate drivers (like the filesystem driver). When the OS tries to load a legitimate DLL, the malicious driver intercepts the request and returns a handle to the malicious DLL instead. kernel dll injector

Detecting kernel-level injections requires moving security monitoring from Ring 3 to Ring 0.

Drivers operate in system context. You can inject into any process, regardless of session ID (e.g., Session 0 isolation isn’t a barrier). Historically, the SSDT is a table that maps

The LoadLibrary approach leaves traces. The DLL appears in the Process Environment Block (PEB) and can be enumerated with tools like Listdlls. Advanced kernel injectors use manual mapping:

The result: The DLL sits in memory with no LDR entry, no file on disk, and no LoadLibrary call. It is invisible to most monitoring tools. The LoadLibrary approach leaves traces

Modern EDRs and anti-cheats (EasyAntiCheat, BattlEye, CrowdStrike, SentinelOne) monitor: